The Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W version 184.108.40.206 web interface does not use session cookies for tracking authenticated sessions. Instead, the web interface uses a “SEID” token that is appended to the end of URLs in GET requests. Thus the “SEID” would be exposed in web proxy logs and browser history. An attacker that is able to capture the “SEID” and originate requests from the same IP address (via a NAT device or web proxy) would be able to access the user interface of the device without having to know the credentials.
advisories | CVE-2020-28333
KL-001-2020-006 : Barco wePresent Authentication Bypass
Title: Barco wePresent Authentication Bypass
Advisory ID: KL-001-2020-006
Publication Date: 2020.11.20
Publication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2020-006.txt
1. Vulnerability Details
Affected Vendor: Barco
Affected Product: wePresent WiPG-1600W
Affected Version: 220.127.116.11
Platform: Embedded Linux
CWE Classification: CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
CVE ID: CVE-2020-28333
2. Vulnerability Description
The Barco wePresent web interface does not use session cookies
for tracking authenticated sessions. Instead, the web interface
uses a "SEID" token that is appended to the end of URLs in GET
requests. Thus the "SEID" would be exposed in web proxy logs
and browser history. An attacker that is able to capture the
"SEID" and originate requests from the same IP address (via
a NAT device or web proxy) would be able to access the user
interface of the device without having to know the credentials.
3. Technical Description
In order to make configuration changes to the Barco wePresent
WiPG-1600W, a "random" value sent to the web interface client
from the device is required to be provided -- the "SEID". It
seems to be acting like a Session ID in a cookie. However,
the "SEID" is passed as a parameter in URLs and in the body
of POSTs. Since it is passed as a parameter in the URL, it
can be logged by web proxies or browser history. An example is:
Where "ertqVvnKV4TjU9Vt" is the SEID. No session cookie exists,
just this value passed on the URL as a parameter, and in the
body of POSTs to make configuration changes. This SEID is all
that is required to access pages behind authentication or to
make configuration changes via POSTs. There is no Authorization
header passed in the HTTP requests.
4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
The vendor has released an updated firmware (18.104.22.168) which
remediates the described vulnerability. Firmware and release
notes are available at:
This vulnerability was discovered by Jim Becher (@jimbecher) of
6. Disclosure Timeline
2020.08.24 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to
2020.08.25 - Barco acknowledges receipt and the intention
2020.09.21 - Barco notifies KoreLogic that this issue,
along with several others reported by KoreLogic,
will require more than the standard 45 business
day remediation timeline. Barco requests to delay
coordinated disclosure until 2020.12.11.
2020.09.23 - KoreLogic agrees to 2020.12.11 coordinated disclosure.
2020.09.25 - Barco informs KoreLogic of their intent to acquire
CVE number for this vulnerability.
2020.11.09 - Barco shares CVE number with KoreLogic and announces
their intention to release the updated firmware
ahead of schedule, on 2020.11.11. Request that KoreLogic
delay public disclosure until 2020.11.20.
2020.11.11 - Barco firmware release.
2020.11.20 - KoreLogic public disclosure.
7. Proof of Concept
See section (3) Technical Description.
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2020
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a
proven track record of providing security services to entities
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: